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BANKRuPTcy SURVEY
INTRODUCTION
During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ad-
dressed a variety of bankruptcy issues. The cases in this Survey were cho-
sen because they modified, rather than reaffirmed, existing precedent.
Two cases clarify prior decisions by this circuit about the non-dis-
chargeability of debts under Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code, and one
case discusses the preclusion of judicial review of trustees' fees under
Chapter 12.
The first case, In re Sampson,' reconciles two inconsistent rulings by
the Tenth Circuit respecting the actual nature of post-marital obligations.
Under the Bankruptcy Code, property settlements between former
spouses are dischargeable while support payments are not.2 Often, how-
ever, these post-marital obligations have characteristics of both a property
settlement and support. The Tenth Circuit has now articulated a rule to
deal with such payments.
The second case, In re Pasek,3 deals with the non-dischargeability ex-
emption of debts that arise from a "willful and malicious injury by the
Debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity."4 This Sur-
vey examines the evolution of the "willful" and "malicious" standards of
this exemption and clarifies the types of acts that satisfy this exemption.
Finally, In re Schollet6 demonstrates how the failure of Congress to
expressly provide for judicial review of trustees' fees under Chapter 12
manifests an intent by Congress to preclude judicial review of such fees.
I. THE DISCHARGEABILITY OF DEBTS OWED BETWEEN FORMER SPOUSES
A. Background
The Bankruptcy Code of 1978 allows a debtor to seek a discharge of
most debts that arise before the date of the order for relief.6 The dis-
charge extinguishes any personal liability of the debtor and is intended to
further the "fresh start"7 policy contained in the Bankruptcy Code.8 Abso-
lution, or a "fresh start," means that debtors may use the Bankruptcy Code
to "reorder their affairs, make peace with their creditors, and enjoy 'a new
1. 997 F.2d 717 (10th Cir. 1993).
2. See 11 U.S.C. § 523 (1988 & Supp. IV. 1992).
3. 983 F.2d 1524 (10th Cir. 1993).
4. Id. at 1526.
5. 980 F.2d 639 (10th Cir. 1992).
6. 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (1988); In re Sampson, 997 F.2d 717, 721 (10th Cir. 1993); see
also 11 U.S.C. § 523 (exceptions to discharge).
7. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
8. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (1988); Shaver v. Shaver, 736 F.2d 1314, 1315-16 (9th Cir.
1984); see generally Kenneth T. Fibich & Ben B. Floyd, Impact of Bankruptcy on Family Law, 29 S.
TEx. L.J. 637, 646 (1988) (discussing § 524(a) discharge).
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opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the
pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.' "9
An individual debtor, however, does not receive a discharge for debts
owed "to a spouse, former spouse, or child . . . for alimony to, mainte-
nance for, or support of such spouse or child" if the debt is "actually in the
nature of alimony, maintenance, or support."10 This exception reflects a
predominant public policy that favors the enforcement of familial obliga-
tions.'1 The policy rests on three rationales: (1) a spouse who lacks job
skills or is incapable of working needs protection from destitution; (2)
minor children may suffer if the custodial parent is forced into the work
force due to the non-custodial parent's bankruptcy filing; and (3) society
should abate the potential increased burden upon the welfare system
which results from a debtor avoiding familial obligations through
bankruptcy.
2
Although post-marital obligations can be categorized as nondis-
chargeable support or dischargeable property settlement,13 sometimes
the exact characterization of post-marital obligations is unclear. In these
cases, the final clause of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (5) requires the post-marital
obligation to actually be in the nature of support to be nondischargeable.
However, determining the actual nature of the obligation has proven
difficult.14
B. Prior Case Law in the Tenth Circuit Regarding the Characterization of Post-
Marital Obligations
In In re Yeates, 15 the Tenth Circuit stated that the "intention of the
parties" is "the initial inquiry" into the actual nature of the post-marital
obligation, 16 and the parties' intent is dispositive on the question of
nondischargeability under Section 523(a) (5). 17 The court also remarked
that "[a] written agreement between the parties is persuasive evidence of
intent, [and] if the agreement between the parties clearly shows that the
parties intended the debt to reflect either support or a property settle-
ment, then that characterization will normally control."' 8 The Yeates court
9. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991) (quoting Local Loan Co., 292 U.S. at
244).
10. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (5) (B) (1988); Shaver, 736 F.2d at 1315.
11. Shaver, 736 F.2d at 1316; see generally Madison Grose, Comment, Putative Spousal Sup-
port Rights and the Federal Bankruptcy Act, 25 UCLA L. REV. 96 (1977) (discussing the purpose
of the Bankruptcy code); Carl D. Young, Note, Dissolution of Marriage and the Bankruptcy Act of
1973: "Fresh Start"Forgotten, 52 IND. L.J. 469 (1977) (discussing the proposed Bankruptcy Act
of 1973).
12. Shaver, 736 F.2d at 1316 n.3; Grose, supra note 11, at 96-97 n.7; see also Audubon v.
Shufeldt, 181 U.S. 575 (1901)(debts arising out of a husband's natural legal duty to support
his wife are not dischargeable under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898).
13. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5); In reYeates, 807 F.2d 874, 876 (10th Cir. 1986); see also
Fibich, supra note 8, at 647.
14. See Fibich, supra note 8, at 650-51.
15. 807 F.2d 874 (10th Cir. 1986).





further declared that resorting to extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent
is necessary only when the agreement between the parties is ambiguous.19
Shortly after Yeates was issued, the Tenth Circuit articulated a seem-
ingly different standard in In re Goin.20 Instead of finding the intent of the
parties in the expressed terms of the agreement, the Coin court stated "a
bankruptcy court must look beyond the language of the [agreement] to
the intent of the parties and to the substance of the obligation."2 1 The
court then enumerated four factors "pertinent" to the inquiry of whether
an obligation is support:
1) if the agreement fails to provide explicitly for spousal support,
the court may presume that the property settlement is intended
for support if it appears under the circumstances that the spouse
needs support; (2) when there are minor children and an imbal-
ance of income, the payments are likely to be in the nature of
support; (3) support or maintenance is indicated when the pay-
ments are made directly to the recipient and are paid in install-
ments over a substantial period of time; and (4) an obligation
that terminates on remarriage or death is indicative of an agree-
ment for support.
22
C. Clarification of the Inquiry: In re Sampson
23
1. Facts
Ira N. Sampson and Katherine Lavonne Sampson divorced in 1984
after nine years of marriage. 24 As part of the divorce proceedings, the
parties incorporated an agreement entitled "Property Settlement and Per-
manent Orders Agreement"25 into the final judgment. Article I of the
Agreement was entitled "Maintenance (Spousal Support)," in which Ira
agreed to pay Katherine a specific monthly amount over an eight-year pe-
riod.26 Article III of the Agreement specifically dealt with the property
settlement between the parties.
27
In November 1990 Ira Sampson filed a voluntary petition under
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.2 8 He claimed at an evidentiary hear-
ing that the parties intended the payments specified in Article I of the
Agreement to be a part of the property settlement but designated them as
maintenance so Ira could deduct the payments from his gross income for
tax purposes. 29 This claim was supported by testimony from his attorney
and accountant. Katherine Sampson testified that she did not remember
such an intention, but her testimony was unsupported because her attor-
19. Id.
20. 808 F.2d 1391 (10th Cir. 1987).
21. Id. at 1392.
22. Id. at 1392-93.
23. 997 F.2d 717 (10th Cir. 1993).
24. Id. at 719.
25. Id.
26. Id at 719-20.
27. Id. at 720.
28. Sampson, 997 F.2d at 720.
29. Id.
1994]
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ney from the divorce proceeding had died. Therefore, she was unable to
refute the testimony of Ira Sampson's attorney and accountant.3 0
The bankruptcy court found for Katherine Sampson, stating that the
Agreement unambiguously provided that the subject payment obligation
was for Katherine's support, and reasoned that extrinsic evidence to the
contrary should be precluded under Yeates.31 The bankruptcy court did
recognize that the Yeates decision conflicted with the Tenth Circuit's hold-
ing in Goin, which required a "bankruptcy court [to] look beyond the lan-
guage of the [agreement] to the intent of the parties and the substance of
the obligation."
32
2. The Court's Opinion
The Tenth Circuit reconciled Yeates and Goin in Sampson. The court
reasoned that a written agreement is persuasive evidence of the parties'
intent at the time the obligation arose.3 3 Additionally, in Sampson the
Agreement" 'did more than simply label payments as alimony or property
settlement; [iut exhibited a structured drafting that purported to deal with
separate issues in totally distinct segments of the document.' ",34 While
recognizing that the language of the document "erected a substantial ob-
stacle" for the party challenging the expressed terms to overcome, the
court added that the express language was not determinative.3 5
The court then examined the extrinsic evidence surrounding the
Agreement. The court found that the alimony and support provisions of
the Agreement would survive Katherine's remarriage, which is suggestive
of a property settlement.36 The payments terminated on her death, how-
ever, which is characteristic of a support obligation.3 7 The alimony and
support payments also could be modified depending on their tax benefit
to Ira, thereby strengthening Katherine's position that the payments were
in the nature of alimony and support.38 Finally, the court recognized that,
at the time of the divorce, Katherine had an obvious need for support.
She had no job, no marketable skills, little education, a health condition,
no income, and monthly living expenses of $4165.0039 Therefore, the
court ruled that the parties' expressed intent, coupled with a functional
analysis of the nature of the payments, demonstrated that the payments




32. See id. at 720 n.3.
33. See Sampson, 997 F.2d at 723.
34. Id (quoting Tilley v. Jessee, 789 F.2d 1074, 1077-78 (4th Cir. 1986)).
35. Sampson, 997 F.2d at 723.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 724.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 725.




The court seemed concerned that Ira Sampson was attempting to
benefit under the tax and bankruptcy codes by arguing inconsistent posi-
tions. Like the Fifth Circuit in a similar case, the Tenth Circuit relied
upon a "quasi-estoppel" doctrine that prevents a party from accepting the
benefit of a statute and then taking an inconsistent position to avoid any
deleterious effects. 41 The court emphasized that inconsistent positions
would amount to a manipulation of the bankruptcy and tax codes.42 The
Tenth Circuit also found that proof of detrimental reliance, though not
necessary, was an important factor in overturning Ira Sampson's posi-
tion. 43 Sampson demonstrates a willingness on the part of the Tenth Cir-
cuit to look beyond the four Goin factors to other surrounding
circumstances.
II. THE DISCHARGEABILITY OF DEBTS THAT ARISE FROM WILLFUL OR
MALICIouS AcTs
A. Background
Section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 provides that a
debtor is not discharged from any debt "for willful and malicious injury by
the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity."4 4 The
language "willful and malicious" is identical to the original exceptions
from discharge found in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, which provided a
debtor "[a] discharge in bankruptcy.., from all his provable debts, except
such as ...are ...for willful and malicious injuries to the person or
property of another."
45
One of the first cases to deal with the non-dischargeability of debts for
"willful and malicious" injuries was Tinker v. Colwell 46 In Tinker, the
debtor sought discharge in bankruptcy for a $50,000 judgment against
him for the act of criminal conversation with Colwell's wife. 4 7 The United
States Supreme Court held that the $50,000judgment was for a willful and
malicious injury, stating, "a willful disregard of what one knows to be his
duty, an act which is against good morals and wrongful in and of itself, and
41. Id. at 724 n.6 (quoting In re Davidson, 947 F.2d 1294, 1297 (5th Cir. 1991)).
42. See Sampson, 997 F.2d at 724-25 n.6 (citing Davidson, 947 F.2d 1294, 1297).
43. See Sampson. 997 F.2d at 726 ("Plaintiff had an obvious need for support at the time
of the divorce.. [and] (d]efendant was clearly in a position to provide support."). See also
Davidson, 947 F.2d at 1297. For other decisions within the Fifth Circuit explaining this
"quasi-estoppel" theory, see Neiman-Marcus Group, Inc. v. Dworkin, 919 F.2d 368, 371 (5th
Cir. 1990); Kaneb Serv., Inc. v. FSLIC, 650 F.2d 78, 81 (5th Cir. 1981).
44. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (1988).
45. Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 17(a)(2), 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(2) (1941) (current version at
11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(16) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); seeJeffrey H. Weinberg, Comment, Acciden-
tal "Willful and Malicious Injury" : The Intoxicated Driver and Section 523(a)(6), I BAuiut. DEv. J.
135, 139 (1984).
46. 193 U.S. 473 (1904).
47. Id. at 474.
1994]
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which necessarily causes injury and is done intentionally, may be said to be
done willfully and maliciously."
48
After Tinker, the ensuing decisions by bankruptcy courts evolved into
two separate interpretations of "willful and malicious" injury. One inter-
pretation focused on whether the debtor acted "deliberately and inten-
tional [ly]" in causing injury.49 The other focused on whether the debtor
acted with "reckless disregard" of the known rights of others.50 Thereaf-
ter, in drafting the current Bankruptcy Code, Congress explicitly rejected
the "reckless disregard" standard under the new Section 523(a) (6).51
The Tenth Circuit defines the willful component as "deliberate and
intentional."52 To define "malicious," the court inquires into the debtor's
actual knowledge, or reasonable foreseeability that his conduct will result
in injury to the creditor. 53 The malice inquiry is not upon "abstract and
perhaps moralistic notions of the 'wrongfulness' of the debtor's act."
54
Malicious intent can be demonstrated two ways: (1) through direct evi-
dence that the debtor's conduct was specifically intended to harm the
creditor; and (2) by evidence, inferred from the debtor's experiences,
acts, or admissions that he "had knowledge of the creditor's rights and
that, with that knowledge, proceeded to take action in violation of those
rights."'55 Therefore, in light of these two components, the Tenth Circuit
has ruled that not every intentional act falls within the exception to dis-
charge if that act is not malicious.
5 6
B. In re Pasek
57
1. Facts
Debtor Gregory James Pasek was an accountant employed by a CPA
firm. On the firm's request, Pasek signed a covenant not to compete
within fifty miles of a city where the firm had an office for a period of
three years should Pasek leave the firm.58 Liquidated damages for viola-
tion of this covenant were set at "150% of the amount billed by [the firm]
48. Id. at 487.
49. SeeIn re Compos, 768 F.2d 1155, 1157 (10th Cir. 1985) (discussing different interpre-
tations of the "willful and malicious" injury provision).
50. See id.; Weinberg, supra note 45, at 140.
51. H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 362-65 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5865 ("[t]o the extent that Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473 (190[4]), held
that a less strict standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker
to apply a 'reckless disregard' standard, they are overruled."); see Weinberg, supra note 45, at
140.
52. Compos, 768 F.2d at 1158; see In rePosta, 866 F.2d 364, 367 (10th Cir. 1989) ("[w]illful
conduct is conduct that is volitional and deliberate and over which the debtor exercises
meaningful control."); cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs, § 8A, cmt. b (1965) (acts "sub-
stantially certain" to cause harm are treated as intentional).
53. Posta, 866 F.2d at 367 (citing In re Egan, 52 B.R. 501, 507 n.4 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1985)).
54. Posta, 866 F.2d at 367.
55. Id. (citations omitted).
56. See Posta, 866 F.2d at 367; Compos, 768 F.2d at 1158.
57. 983 F.2d 1524 (10th Cir. 1993).
58. Id. at 1525.
[Vol. 71:4
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to the client for services rendered in the prior twelve months."59 Soon
afterward, the CPA firm began to make additional demands of Pasek. The
firm decided that the accountants and their spouses should project a cer-
tain image to the community and clients. The image required conformity
in home decoration, automobile selection, spousal attire, grooming, and
manners. 60 The firm was particularly critical of Pasek's wife. 6 1 The firm
also assigned Pasek one of the two highest billing quotas, even though
Pasek had two children with serious, time-consuming medical problems.
62
Pasek disagreed with the firm's decisions about client allocation, leverage,
and what he perceived as inequitable enforcement of the non-competition
covenant.
63
Eventually, Pasek left the firm for the sake of his family. 64 He opened
a competing office and several of his clients followed him. 65 The CPA
firm sued Pasek. Several days before the trial commenced, Pasek filed a
voluntary petition for bankruptcy and sought discharge of the damages
alleged by his former firm.
66
2. Opinion
The bankruptcy court found that, although Pasek was aware of the
covenant not to compete, 67 the CPA firm had not established a "willful
and malicious" injury partly because Pasek acted due to severe economic
and family needs. 68 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit opined that non-dis-
chargeability under Section 523(a) (6) requires proof of deliberate and in-
tentional injury.69 Malicious intent may be demonstrated by evidence that
the debtor knew of the creditor's rights and, with that knowledge, acted in
violation of those rights. 70 Therefore, " 'the debtor's actual knowledge or
the reasonable foreseeability that his conduct will result in injury to the
creditor'[is] highly relevant."'7' Nevertheless, the Pasek court ruled that
such knowledge or reasonable foreseeability does not automatically re-
quire a finding of "willful and malicious" injury. The court reasoned that
any asserted motivation, justification, or excuse must also be examined to
discover the malice in addition to willfulness. 72 In the case at bar, the
bankruptcy court's ruling that Pasek had adequate justifications and ex-
59. Id. at 1525-16.






66. Pasek, 983 F.2d at 1526.
67. id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1527.
70. Id. at 1527; see Posta, 866 F.2d at 367; see also In re Grey, 902 F.2d 1479, 1481 (10th
Cir. 1990).
71. Pasek, 983 F.2d at 1527 (quoting Posta, 866 F.2d at 367).
72. Pasek, 983 F.2d at 1527; see Posta, 866 F.2d at 367 ("willfulness" is straightforward;
"maliciousness" is more complex).
1994]
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cuses for his conduct was affirmed. 73 Given the justification, the conclu-
sion of the bankruptcy court that the CPA firm's injury was not the result




Before Pasek, the "willful and malicious" standard applied to a debtor
who knew or could reasonably foresee that his conduct would cause in-
jury.75 Under this old standard, it was clear that Pasek's intentional acts
(of opening his own office and taking clients with him) were "willful and
malicious" because Pasek knowingly violated the CPA firm's contractual
rights.
In Pasek, however, the Tenth Circuit viewed the debtor's personal ex-
cuse as a defense to the non-dischargeability of alleged "willful and mali-
cious" injuries. Pasek thus expands on Posta, which rejected consideration
of "abstract and perhaps moralistic notions of the 'wrongfulness' of the
debtor's act" when analyzing the malice component.76 The Tenth Circuit
has significantly broadened the "malice" inquiry, and has done so in a
manner that furthers the Bankruptcy Code's policy of "fresh start."7 7 In
this case, the discharge of Pasek's debts to the CPA firm will allow him to
start his life over, free from any "pressure or discouragement"78 from the
covenant not to compete.
III. THE PRECLUSION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OVER TRUSTEE'S FEES UNDER
CHAPTER 12: IN RE S cuarg7r.
7 9
A. Background
Bankruptcy courts handled both judicial and administrative functions
prior to the passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.80 These ad-
ministrative functions included: organizing and scheduling meetings of
creditors, composing creditors' committees, appointing trustees, and set-
ting trustees' fees. 8 1 Under the former statutory scheme, the bankruptcy
court had the power to review and adjust the trustee's fee in individual
cases.82 Congress believed this combination ofjudicial and administrative
functions eroded public confidence in bankruptcy proceedings and un-
73. Pasek, 983 F.2d at 1528. These justifications and excuses included the material alter-
ations of the partnership agreement by the CPA firm including: the attempt to regulate
debtor's personal affairs, imposing unreasonable billable hour quotas, and the reasonable
reliance by the debtor on a legal opinion that the covenant not to compete was unenforce-
able. Id.
74. Id.
75. Posta, 866 F.2d at 367.
76. I
77. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
78. Id.
79. 980 F.2d 639 (10th Cir. 1992).





necessarily burdened bankruptcy judges. 83 Therefore, Congress created
the United States Trustee "pilot program" as part of the Bankruptcy Code
of 1978 to address these concerns. 84 Under this "pilot program," a limited
number of bankruptcy jurisdictions transferred their administrative func-
tions under Chapter 13 to the United States Trustees.
85
The United States Trustees, appointed by the United States Attorney
General,8 6 are authorized to appoint private trustees for all bankruptcy
cases arising under Chapters 7 and 13, and where appropriate to appoint
standing trustees for all Chapter 13 cases within a given judicial district.
87
Over time, this "pilot program" appointment of standing trustees "resulted
in a more efficient... Chapter 13 program than the appointment of dif-
ferent trustees to serve in particular Chapter 13 cases."
88
The "pilot program" was such a success that it was included in the
BankruptcyJudges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy
Act of 198689 for phase-in nationwide under the newly created Chapter 12
bankruptcy. 90 Under the 1986 Act, certain judicial districts are chosen by
the Attorney General for implementation of the United States Trustee Sys-
tem. Once a district is certified, the United States Trustee for that district
determines the district's need for a standing trustee. 9 1 Compensation for
the standing trustee is determined by the Attorney General after consulta-
tion with the United States Trustee.
92
Under the compensation plan, a standing trustee receives a fee set by
a fixed percentage of the payments to the trustee by the debtor.93 This fee
is not to exceed ten percent of payments up to $450,000 under a Chapter
12 reorganization plan. 94 If the payments exceed $450,000, then the
trustee's fee is reduced to three percent for the surplus payments. 95 The
total fees collected from all debtors is limited to the basic pay for level V
employees on the executive schedule.9 6 Excess fees are then used to fund
the United States Trustee System.
97
83. Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 764, 99th Cong. 2nd Sess. 17-18 (1988), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N 5227, 5230).
84. See In re Savage, 67 B.R. 700, 702 (Bankr. D.RI. 1986).
85. Schollett, 980 F.2d at 641.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 642; 28 U.S.C. § 586(b) (1988).
88. Savage, 67 B.R. at 702 (quoting 5 COLLIER ON BANRuvrcv 1 1302.01 at 1302-20 (15th
ed. 1984)).
89. Pub.L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088 (1986).
90. Scholett, 980 F.2d at 642.
91. See id.
92. 28 U.S.C. § 586(e) (1988).
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B. In re Schollett
1. Facts
The day the 1986 Act took effect, the bankruptcy judge for the Dis-
trict of Wyoming appointed Sharon Dunivent as standing trustee for all
Chapter 12 cases in the district.98 Wyoming was eventually certified by the
Attorney General, and the United States Trustee determined that a stand-
ing trustee in Wyoming was warranted.99 Therefore, Sharon Dunivent was
immediately reappointed on August 31, 1987 as standing trustee1 0 0 with a
fee arrangement of ten percent as set by the Attorney General. 10
Andrew and Lynn Schollett filed a Chapter 12 reorganization plan for
their family farm with the bankruptcy court for the District of Wyoming on
April 15, 1987. This plan required the Scholletts to make five annual pay-
ments of approximately $30,000 to the standing trustee, Sharon Dunivent,
who would then pay their various creditors. 10 2 Although the reorganiza-
tion plan was approved before the Attorney General certified Wyoming,
the plan was to take effect after certification. Therefore, the Attorney
General's fee schedule applied to the standing trustee.'
0 3
The first payment by the Scholletts was made to Dunivent on August
4, 1988, but Dunivent refused to pay the creditors until the Scholletts paid
the ten percent fee as well. 10 4 On September 23, 1988, the bankruptcy
court issued an order to the Scholletts, requiring them to pay Dunivent
her ten percent fee. The Scholletts refused. 10 5 They appealed to the dis-
trict court, arguing that the ten percent fee of $15,000 was unreasonable
since Dunivent's duties, involving writing seven checks over the next five
years, would take no more than a total of fifteen hours. 10 6 The district
court determined that Dunivent's fee was unreasonable, reduced the fee
to five percent, and remanded the case. 10 7 The district court reasoned
that, even though 11 U.S.C. § 326(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 586 removed the
bankruptcy court's authority to appoint standing trustees, the statute did
not explicitly preclude a review of the trustees' fees. Since the bankruptcy
court did have the power to review the fees prior to the 1978 and 1986
Acts, and since those acts failed to explicitly preclude review, the court
reasoned that "the power to review trustees' fees for reasonableness had
not been stripped from the courts." 108 Dunivent appealed. 10 9
98. Schollett, 980 F.2d at 642.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id; see supra text accompanying note 80.
102. Schollett, 980 F.2d at 640.
103. Id. at 642.
104. Id. at 640.
105. See id. at 641.
106. Id.






In Schollett, the Tenth Circuit had to decide whether the 1986 Act re-
moved the power of federal courts to review the fees set by the Attorney
General for standing trustees. 10 The Scholletts argued that preclusion of
review would be contrary to the legislative intent of the 1986 Act, which
was to provide family farmers advantages not available in other forms of
bankruptcy.1 "' They further argued the ten percent fees added cost to a
reorganization plan, risking the destruction of an otherwise viable oppor-
tunity for reorganization.'
1 2
The Tenth Circuit recognized that the Chapter 12 statutory scheme
did not expressly preclude judicial review of trustees' fees.1 13 Neverthe-
less, the court decided that the statutory language and structure indicated
that such review was not possible. The court reviewed the "clear and cate-
gorical"' 14 language of 28 U.S.C. § 586(e) regarding the Attorney Gen-
eral's explicit duty to set fees for trustees. This language "[did] not suggest
an oversight function for the courts."1 15 The court noted that "28 U.S.C.
§ 586(e)(1) requires the Attorney General to 'fix' the maximum annual
compensation of trustees . . . [and] § 586(e) (2) states that the standing
trustee 'shall collect such percentage fee from all payments under the
plan.' 1116 This explicit language differs from the language for Chapter 7
and 11 bankruptcy cases. Under these Chapters, the trustee's fees are spe-
cifically committed to the discretion of the bankruptcy courts, 1 17 and the
reasonableness of the trustee's fees are to be "based on the nature, the
extent, and the value of such services."' 1 8 Thus, the Tenth Circuit con-
cluded that when Congress wanted judicial review of trustees' fees under
Chapter 7 and 11 it made that intent clear, and that the absence of similar
language for Chapter 12 reflected a congressional intent to preclude such
review of trustees' fees.'
19
Finally, the court reasoned that because the amount of the trustee's
fee depends upon the total of the payment by the debtor to the trustee,
most trustees' fees will be reasonable in each particular case. 120 Also, the
fee reduces to three percent once the payments exceed $450,000. This
reduction reflects a method to reduce fees when the trustee enjoys "econ-
omies of scale." 121 Therefore, the statutory reduction to three percent
limits the possibility of abuse for large fees, thereby lessening the need for
110. Id.
111. Id. at 642.
112. Scholett, 980 F.2d at 642. The Scholletts cited In re Kline, 94 B.R. 557 (Bankr. N.D.
Ind. 1988) in support of this argument.
113. Schollett, 980 F.2d at 643.
114. Id.
115. Id. (citing In re Savage, 67 B.R. 700, 705-6 (D.R.I. 1986)).
116. Schollett, 980 F.2d at 644.
117. Id.; 11 U.S.C. § 326 (1988).
118. 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) (1988); Schollett, 980 F.2d at 644.
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judicial review.1 22 The court reversed the district court and remanded the




The Scholltt decision departs from the bankruptcy policy of "fresh
start."1 24 The decision to preclude judicial review of trustees' fees places
the burden of financing the United States Trustee System upon those
debtors who can afford to pay the fee. The court found that large fees in
cases where payments are high, but where work is small, will subsidize
other cases where the debtor's payments are low but involve a great deal of
work. 125 The Schollett court noted that it would be unfair to the trustee,
who has agreed to serve in all cases regardless of the compensation, to
impose another layer of review. 126 However, the court omitted mention
of the unfairness to debtors who, already in financial difficulty, are forced
to bear the administrative cost of other debtors. This is contrary to the
policy of "fresh start"1 2 7 because the debtor under Chapter 12 retains "the
pressure and discouragement of [their] preexisting debt"128 in the form of
unreasonably high trustee fees when compared to "the nature, the extent,
and the value"129 of the trustee's services.
IV. CONCLUSION
The cases surveyed reveal the federal judiciary's awareness of other
policy considerations beyond the original bankruptcy policy of "fresh
start." This is particularly clear in In re Pasek, where the court discharged a
facially "willful and malicious" injury by the debtor when the debtor had
an excuse for the conduct. However, In re Sampson shows that the "fresh
start" policy must give way when an overriding policy exists, such as the
enforcement of familial obligations. Finally, In re Schollett demonstrates
that certain policies regarding the efficient administration of the bank-




123. Id at 645.
124. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
125. See Scholkt, 980 F.2d at 644-45.
126. See id at 645.
127. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
128. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991) (quoting Local Loan Co., 292 U.S. at
244).
129. 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) (1988).
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